



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520



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MEMORANDUM

September 5, 1975

To: Members of and Participants in the Working Group/  
Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism

From: Robert A. Fearey, Chairman of the Working Group/  
Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism

Subject: Ninety-first Meeting of the Working Group/Cabinet  
Committee to Combat Terrorism, Wednesday, September  
3, 1975, 2:30 p.m., Department of State, Room 7516

I. Preliminary

A. Status of Kidnapping Cases in Ethiopia and  
Colombia. Mr. Fearey referred to the two ongoing kid-  
napping cases. With regard to the two Americans kidnapped  
in Ethiopia, we remained hopeful they would soon be re-  
leased, probably on the Sudanese border, but were disap-  
pointed that this had not yet happened. The kidnapping in  
Bogota on August 6 of Sears-Roebuck executive Donald  
Cooper was a difficult case. The matter was being handled  
essentially by Sears in cooperation with the Colombian  
Government. The U.S. had cooperated discreetly where it  
could help, such as handwriting analysis, but had not  
participated or been involved in any way in any negotiat-  
ing process.

B. ....

DECLASSIFIED • E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6  
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (c), (g)

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MR 94-29, #24, State letter 9/23/96

By WT NARA. Date 9/30/96

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C. Retirement of General Davis. Mr. Fearey said that this was, regrettably, the last meeting of the Working Group's most distinguished member. General Davis had been a charter member of the Group and over the past nearly three years no member had surpassed, equaled or perhaps even rivaled his substantive contribution to and loyal support of it. Notwithstanding his key responsibilities in the Department of Transportation, he had remained a regular and active participant. Among his many contributions perhaps the most signal was the leading part he had played in the highly successful airport security program which had been instrumental in bringing the hijacking problem under control. Speaking on behalf of the entire Working Group, Mr. Fearey offered General Davis very best wishes for a well-deserved and rewarding retirement.

In reply General Davis said that the establishment of USG policies on terrorism had strongly influenced what could be done to control hijacking. He hoped that the U.S. would remain firm and reasonable in its anti-terrorism policies and programs. We were far from a solution to the problem but our efforts to combat terrorism must and would go on. General Davis said that he had enjoyed his association with the Working Group and wished it well for the future.

D. Secretary Kissinger's Remarks on Terrorism. Mr. Fearey referred to Secretary Kissinger's comments on terrorism in his August 11 Montreal speech and at his August 17 press conference in Vail.

Mr. Fearey said that at Montreal the Secretary had urged the UN once again to take up and adopt the U.S. 1972 proposal of an international Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism, or other similar proposals. Mr. Fearey said he had received a number of Washington Embassy and other queries on US intentions in light of the Secretary's remarks. He had replied that the Secretary's proposal spoke for itself, that he could not add to it, but that clearly the Secretary had been motivated by the evident need for more effective international action against the terrorist threat, and particularly by the need for more effective apprehension, trial and punishment of terrorists. Mr. Fearey said that he did not know what USG follow-up there might be to the Secretary's proposal.

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At Vail the Secretary had said that it is our policy that American officials do not participate in negotiations on the release of victims of terrorists. Mr. Fearey said that at the moment he did not know whether the Secretary meant that it is our policy not to negotiate with terrorists under any circumstances, or only not to participate in negotiations pointing toward payment of ransom, release of prisoners or other concessions to terrorist blackmail. He said that action was in train to obtain clarification of the Secretary's exact meaning.

## II. The Current Status of Major Terrorist Organizations in Latin America

Mr. James Buchanan, Office of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, spoke on the coordination of terrorist groups in Latin America and on terrorism in Argentina.

He said that over the past few years coordination among terrorist groups had been carried out through informal and formal means. An example of informal coordination was the use of Chile as a stopping place by certain southern cone terrorist groups during the Allende period. Movement in and out of Chile by such terrorists was easy at that time. Cuba (less now than in the past) is a training ground for terrorists. Europe, particularly Paris, provides meeting grounds for informal contacts by Latin American terrorists.

As to formal coordination of terrorist groups in the southern cone, Che Guevara's effort in Bolivia was an early example. His choice of Bolivia was motivated, at least in part, by his intention to use it as a center from which the actions of the region's liberation movements might be coordinated. His attempts came to nothing. The current approach to formal coordination is the Revolutionary Coordination Junta (JCR). It was established in February 1974 as the child of the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) of Argentina. The JCR's other members include the MIR of Chile, the ELN of Bolivia, and the Tupamaros of Uruguay. The objective of the JCR is a vague socialism. While the ERP thrives, remaining JCR members have been broken up by national security forces. Consequently the JCR has not come to much. This is true despite continuing efforts at activity abroad such as the JCR magazine "Che Guevara," published in Lisbon, and certain activities in Paris. In general, the national security forces of the southern cone

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surpass the terrorists in cooperation at the international level.

Mr. Buchanan said that the most virulent terrorism in Latin America is in Argentina. Deaths from terrorism are occurring at about a one-a-day rate. Terrorist groups are on both the right and the left. Those on the left are dominated by the ERP and the Montoneros. The ERP emerged in 1970 as a "Trotskyite" organization and is well-led and well financed. It is thought to have between 500 and 700 combatants and remains highly effective. Also on the left are the Montoneros, a nationalist Peronist group with perhaps 2500 combatants and between 25,000 and 50,000 sympathizers. It is less well led and effective than the ERP but has infiltrated the Government. On occasion the ERP and the Montoneros have cooperated for specific projects, but ideological incompatibility makes permanent cooperation unlikely. The Communist Party of Argentina makes every effort to disassociate itself from violence.

On the right is the AAA (Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance). It is probably the umbrella organization for a number of anti-leftist groups in Argentina. Before his departure from Argentina it was led by Lopez Rega. The AAA is particularly brutal and violent, reflecting a nasty streak in the Argentine rightist tradition going back to the 1930's.

A characteristic of terrorism in Argentina is that targets are carefully chosen. As a rule innocent bystanders are not touched. Also terrorism in Argentina is indirect in that terrorist leaders of both the right and the left, though easily identifiable, are not attacked.

In response to questions, Mr. Buchanan said that there were now few foreign businessmen in Argentina, including Americans, because of numerous kidnappings for ransom. Kidnapping of foreign diplomats, as in the Egan case, had been for specific political impact. In the Egan case, the terrorists' purpose was to demonstrate their refusal to accept the Argentine Government's policy of interrogating and then killing captured terrorists, and to revalidate their "anti-imperialist" credentials. Mr. Buchanan did not view a strong government drive against terrorists in Argentina as likely unless a military government assumes power.

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III. DIA Programs for Protecting Defense Attaches Against Terrorism

Mr. Michael Jakub, Defense Intelligence Agency, described the DIA counter-terrorist program for Defense Attaches. He said that State is primarily responsible for the protection of Defense Attache Office (DAO) personnel abroad. DIA pays a proportionate share of the cost of State's protective programs at posts where DAO personnel are assigned.

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IV. Other DOD Counter-Terrorism Measures

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Asked by Mr. Fearey for his views on the desirability of increased coordination among interested agencies in counter-terrorism protective arrangements for overseas personnel, Major Naftzinger said he believed that at overseas posts personnel of all agencies should look to the Ambassador as the focal point on counter-terrorist policy and procedures. Each agency in Washington with overseas personnel should have its own modus operandi for counter-terrorism measures, but these should be based on centrally coordinated policy guidelines accepted by all agencies. Mr. Fearey said that Major Naftzinger's position seemed in accord with his own, namely, that there should be close coordination on terrorism protective measures among Washington agencies having personnel abroad but there should be no attempt to force all agencies into the same mold. General Davis expressed the view that the Ambassador should play the key role in setting the tone and providing strong leadership to the Country Team in establishing counter-terrorist policy and procedures in each country.

The next meeting of the Working Group will be held September 17, 1975 in Room 7516.

Enclosure:

Participants List

Participants

NINETY-FIRST MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP/  
CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT TERRORISM

September 3, 1975

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Title</u>
ACDA	Mr. Frank Martin	Staff Officer
AID	Mr. Oscar Yost	Deputy Director, Office of Security
CIA	.....	.....
DOA	LtCol Dwight A. Davis	LTC Action Officer
DOA	Mr. Carl J. LeBourdais	LTC Action Officer
DOA/DIA	Mr. Michael A. Jakub	Intelligence Operations Specialist
DOD/DIA	Capt. Charles J. Bushey	Intelligence Officer
DOD/OSD	Mr. Joseph Naftzinger	Staff Assistant
DOT	Gen. Benjamin Davis	Assistant Secretary
ERDA	Mr. A. Bryan Siebert	Spec Asst. Dep. Asst. Adm. Nat. Sec.
FBI	Mr. V. H. Nasca	Special Agent
FPS	Mr. Charles Robinson	Special Agent, Central Office
FPS	Mr. Walter J. Burns	Director, Operations Svces. Div.
INS	Mr. T. J. Brobson	Asst. Comm. Inspections
Justice	Ms. Janis Sposato	Attorney
Justice	Mr. Ralph K. Culver	Attorney
MPDC	D/C Robert L. Rabe	Spec. Operations Division
NRC	Mr. Frank A. Costaneo	OSS/SSS
NRC	Mr. Thomas F. Carter	Chief, Contingency Planning
NSA	Mt. H. B. Sutliff	Chief, Executive Liaiaon
NSC Staff	Mr. Gerald P. Dargis	Staff Officer
Treasury	Mr. Richard Schultz	O/S
USSS	Mr. Paul Rundle	Deputy Assistant Director
USSS	Mr. Bill Livingood	SAIC
State	Mr. James Buchanan	Political Analyst
State	Mr. Edward V. Hickey	Assistant Director, SY
State	Mr. Louis R. Hague	IO/UNP
State	Mr. David B. Ortman	Chief, Aviation Programs & Pol. Div.
State	Mr. Samuel C. Keiter	Dep. Chief, Av. Prog. & Pol. Div.
State	Mr. Robert A. Fearey	Chairman, Working Group
State	Mr. Edward W. Schaefer	S/CCT
State	Mr. Robert P. Myers, Jr.	S/CCT
State	Ms. Maureen Hollander	S/CCT